War, Manipulation of Consent, and Deliberative Democracy by Lewis, William S.
Skidmore College
Creative Matter
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship Philosophy Department
2008
War, Manipulation of Consent, and Deliberative
Democracy
William S. Lewis
Skidmore College
Follow this and additional works at: https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/phil_rel_fac_schol
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at Creative Matter. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Creative Matter. For more information, please contact jluo@skidmore.edu.
Recommended Citation
LEWIS, W. (2008). War, Manipulation of Consent, and Deliberative Democracy. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 22(4),
266-277. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25670725
266
 War, Manipulation of Consent, and 
Deliberative Democracy 
 WILLIAM S.  LEWIS 
 Skidmore College 
 For many in the social sciences, the 2004 U.S. presidential and congressional 
elections have become oft-cited examples of the limits of procedural democracy. 
Pulling on public opinion from before the election as well as other data, political 
scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, and specialists in communication have 
sought to explain the results of these elections (which guaranteed a continuation of 
the Iraq War) in terms of elites framing the political discourse; emotional, media, 
and rhetorical manipulation; appeal to ideology; dissemination of bad or inaccu-
rate information; and existential triggers. That each of these causal factors in the 
election bypasses rational and public deliberation, that none results from inquiry 
into the truthfulness of the political opinions regarding the war and its justifi ca-
tions, and the subsequent public opinion data showing that the public has changed 
its opinion on the prosecution of the war and on the legitimacy of its rationale, 
may signal that there are fatal problems with American democracy. 1 If anything, 
the aftermath of the 2006 congressional elections when Democratic and antiwar 
majorities were elected to both houses and Iraq policy failed to change may be 
seen as confi rmation of this judgment that democracy conceived and practiced as 
the aggregation of preferences for representative candidates is deeply fl awed. 
 While the social scientists mentioned above do not usually go so far in 
their analysis, since the 1980s political philosophers have been arguing that it 
is precisely these types of defi ciencies that can be remedied by the adoption of 
 deliberative democratic norms and procedures. Being in agreement with the major-
ity of deliberative democratic theorists who argue that the adoption of deliberative 
norms for political decision making will make for more democratic outcomes, 
this article will examine the practical obstacles that deliberative democracy may 
not be able to overcome. Though it does not argue that deliberative democracy 
is, because of these obstacles, untenable, impracticable, or unworthy of pursuit, 
this essay does claim that one of the  factors identifi ed by social scientists and 
philosophers as compromising the legitimacy and practical value of political 
judgment is ineliminable. Perhaps surprisingly, the conclusion is not drawn from 
this observation that deliberative democracy is a practical impossibility. Instead, 
it is argued that one of these factors, ideology, is a hindrance to deliberative 
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 democracy as well as a prerequisite for it and, therefore, that we should not strive 
for its elimination from the deliberative space. 
 Given the tendency of electoral, representative democracy to produce politi-
cal outcomes that fail to refl ect the public’s will and its idea of the good, proponents 
of deliberative democracy have championed deliberation as that practice by which 
the public can come to feel responsible for its constitution and laws. Departing 
from Rousseau’s (1987, 149, 204) insight that deliberation is the necessary process 
that facilitates this formation, most theorists of deliberative democracy theory have 
taken as their project the challenge of ensuring the legitimacy of the decisions 
reached by deliberation, where “legitimacy” is understood as the production of a 
decision that everyone can accept (Bohman 1998a, 402). This emphasis on ensur-
ing the legitimacy of political decisions has led to a focus on the normative and 
procedural aspects of deliberation. Driven by these concerns and inspired mostly 
by the work of Rawls and Habermas, political theorists have attempted (a) to  defi ne 
the pure procedural structure that best allows such consensus formation, (b) to 
delimit the decisions that can be the subject of political deliberation, and (c) to 
defi ne the type of individual that can participate in deliberation. Though there 
is disagreement among theorists about the specifi c content of each criterion for 
effective and fair deliberation as well as about their respective necessity, a rough 
consensus has developed about what deliberation requires. These criteria include, 
fi rst, an institutional space or arrangement that guarantees neutrality and protects 
against the manipulation of the discussion and of the discussants. Second, effec-
tive and fair deliberation needs the participation of individuals who (a) are aware 
of the relevant features of the political world, (b) can reason about political ends, 
and (c) can look past their own immediate political preferences to rationally and 
freely choose the general good. Put succinctly, democratic deliberation requires 
a noncoercive space and free discussion between autonomous, informed, and 
rational individuals. 
 Even as the consensus detailed above was in the process of developing, 
political philosophers and theorists began to think about how to apply these 
 insights so as to reform democratic practice. Comparing existing institutions and 
citizens to the deliberative democratic ideal, it was obvious that one or both were 
insuffi cient to guarantee fair and good deliberation. Thus was born the discus-
sion of deliberative democracy’s feasibility (Bohman 1998a, 401), which asked 
questions such as whether such reform is possible, how much reform is needed, 
and what specifi c reforms are necessary for deliberative democracy to come 
into being. Within the literature that judges deliberative democracy to indeed be 
feasible, there is a bit of a split. While some theorists such as Joshua Cohen and 
Jürgen Habermas focus only on the need to create noncoercive spaces in order 
to allow already suffi ciently autonomous, informed, and rational individuals to 
deliberate on the public good, others suggest not only that our existing forums are 
insuffi cient for democratic deliberation but that existing citizens are insuffi ciently 
autonomous, informed, and rational to deliberate about the public good. Though 
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the philosophical literature that makes the latter suggestion only sometimes pulls 
on this evidence to make its point, in recent years there has been a growing body 
of research in the social sciences that reinforces these speculative conclusions 
about the ability of citizens to make informed, free, and rational decisions. 
 Drawing on this literature as well as on the insights offered by participants 
in the feasibility discussion, this article will catalog the practices, institutions, and 
psychological proclivities that have been cited as obstacles to the realization of a 
deliberative democratic politics. After this survey, it will separate those obstacles 
that are remediable from those that are not. Because most of the irremediable 
obstacles are those that compromise the rationality, autonomy, and knowledge of 
citizens, this separation will have the effect of forcing us to rethink the promise 
of deliberative democracy as well as the means for its instantiation. 
 The fi rst obstacle this essay will address is that having to do with institu-
tions. Because the legitimacy of a democratic decision rests for deliberativists 
on it being the result of a fair procedure in which individuals reason and decide 
without constraints about the public good, an institutional space or arrangement 
that guarantees neutrality and protects against the manipulation of the discussion 
and of the discussants is a necessity. This is the case because deliberations are 
fair only if each of the participants has an equal ability to reason about and then 
argue for his or her idea of the good. However, as Iris Marion Young and many 
others have pointed out (Sanders 1997; Young 1996), there are many people who 
are ill-equipped to provide reasons in a public forum for their idea of the good. 
For these people, any institutional structure that sets this type of discourse to be 
the norm is a nonneutral space in the sense that it privileges those who can argue 
in rational terms for their idea of the good. 
 In addition to this institutional bias, there is also the problem of preference 
change (or decision making) resulting not from reasoned deliberation about the 
good for oneself and others but from the persuasive effects of fellow deliberators. 
This result may come about from a fellow deliberator’s elite status, from a claim 
to unique knowledge, or from a claim about expertise in some area of public life. 
It also may come about simply because some deliberator or deliberators have 
 developed superior rhetorical skills. Contrary to earlier studies, which hypoth-
esized that a subject’s perceived social status and expertise have little infl uence on 
public opinion, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that this effect is 
far from negligible (Shapiro 1998). For instance, studies of the effect of rhetorical 
tropes used by the Bush administration to encourage support for the Second Gulf 
War have shown public opinion to be malleable by such devices (Kellner 2007; 
Stuckey and Ritter 2007). Given these effects, a space that protects against the 
manipulation of the discussion and of the discussants would be one that prohibits 
claims to authority, expertise, or superior knowledge and the display of rhetorical 
skills. For fair procedures, this may be necessary, and, indeed, some have argued 
that rhetoric be banned from the deliberative space (Dryzek 2000, 67). It is easy to 
see why we might also wish to decrease the infl uence of elites in any deliberative 
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process. However, for a deliberation that wishes to arrive not only at fair but also 
at good results, the banning of experts and their expertise may prove undesirable. 
This problem and its solution will be discussed below. 
 Institutional prejudice and suasion by rhetoric or claimed  superiority of 
judgment during the course of deliberation are not, however, the only  manipulations 
that deliberative practice has to worry about. In addition, there is the concern about 
the manipulation of opinion that has always already taken place before formal 
deliberations about the public good are inaugurated. The persuasive effects of 
authority, expertise, and rhetoric mentioned above can achieve this manipulation. 
Without the constraints of an institutional space designed to ensure fair delibera-
tion, these effects may be amplifi ed by the media, by public sentiment, and by 
group polarization (Josly 1997; Talisse 2004, 109). With this amplifi cation, the 
number of options entertained in deliberation about what is good for the public 
is limited, and premature consensuses can be formed. To give an example of this 
narrowing, one recent social psychological study has shown how the major news 
media in the United States accepted and amplifi ed the “War on Terror” rhetoric 
of the Bush administration and used it as a “shorthand device to summarize a 
wide range of complex issues and events” (Lipschultz 2007, 21). Synthesizing 
and summarizing the results of similar empirical studies on the impact of media 
coverage on political thought, Richard D. Anderson has concluded that “the media’s 
impact on the American citizen appears to be baleful for democratic deliberation. 
Media coverage of elections encourages citizens to think about . . . personalities, 
not about issues, . . . to focus on their feelings of intimacy with the candidate, not 
on reasoned considerations . . . [and to] . . . shift people’s attention from issues 
they would otherwise consider important to the issues they see on the screen” 
(1998, 481). 
 Thus far, this discussion has focused on those obstacles to deliberative 
democracy that hinder a citizen’s ability to reason well and to decide fairly about 
political ends. It has not yet focused on those obstacles that, when deliberation is 
put into practice, compromise individual autonomy. By virtue of bypassing their 
reason entirely, these sorts of obstacles prevent citizens from being “authors as 
well as subjects of the law” (Cooke 2000, 955–56). There have been not a few 
recent social scientifi c studies on this subject, with some seeking specifi cally to 
explain how Bush maintained political support through the 2004 elections despite 
major domestic and foreign problems as well as turmoil internal to his admin-
istration. Based on experiments that showed a correlation between awareness of 
one’s own mortality and support for charismatic and conservative leaders, one 
group of social psychologists hypothesized that Bush benefi ted from the frequent 
recollections of the terror of 9/11 made by candidates and by the media during the 
run-up to the election. When this specifi c hypothesis was tested, the test showed 
a correlation between reminders of mortality and of 9/11 and increased support 
for George W. Bush (while the opposite correlation was revealed for John Kerry 
[Landau et al. 2004]). Using different methodologies, recent studies in sociology 
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and political science have also suggested that the emotions of fear and shame 
played a large part in shaping political conduct since 9/11 (Burkitt 2005; Lanning 
2005). If such correlations are confi rmed, then there is more and more reason 
to suspect that passion and not reason plays a deciding factor in choices about 
the public good. 
 Another factor that compromises autonomy is ideology. This compromise 
is obvious if one understands ideology as it has been classically formulated as 
false consciousness of one’s actual existential situation and of the world that has 
been produced by economic or social causes. Even if we reject the idea that there 
is a “true consciousness” that can be found by social scientifi c research, critique, 
or revolutionary activity and reformulate ideology functionally as that necessary 
set of beliefs held by groups of individuals whose effect is to guarantee the repro-
duction of certain socioeconomic relations (Althusser 1971, 132–33, 1995, 274; 
Lewis 2005), there is still in this minimal defi nition a recognition of a compromise 
of autonomy. This is true even if we go with the extremely thin defi nition offered 
by Adam Przeworski, who holds that to recognize ideology one does not need 
to attribute any causality for it but simply to recognize the empirical fact that 
 “individual beliefs are endogenous with regard to the distribution of income, [and] 
with regard to political institutions” (1998, 155). This is the case because one of 
the features of ideology is that certain ends and certain reasons seem intuitively 
reasonable or unreasonable when presented to a subject operating from within 
a specifi c ideology. In that they depend on the subject’s own reason, decisions 
made on the basis of ideology are, in a certain sense, autonomous. However, the 
fact that this reason and the understanding of the world that this reason works 
with may serve ends other than that of the subject’s or the public’s good refl ects, 
fundamentally, a compromise of autonomy. Therefore, though deliberations might 
seem to engage the faculty of reason and decisions might appear to the subject 
as freely made, what seems reasonable to a particular subject is always already 
somewhat or largely predetermined. 
 Though for the last few decades the psychological literature has, like the 
Anglo-American philosophical literature, been skeptical of the position that people 
are inclined by ideology rather than by self-interest (Jost 2006), there have been 
a number of recent studies that support the points made above about ideology 
and its effect on reason. This is the case even if the functional explanation for its 
existence is psychological rather than socioeconomic (the two explanations are 
not incompatible). For example, a study that recently appeared in the  American 
Psychologist shows that voters’ self-identifi ed traits and values are decisive in 
political choice (Caprara and Zimbardo 2004), while another from the journal 
 Social Psychology registers a correlation between groups differentiated by their 
shared values and these groups’ “support for pro- and anti-war action” (Bliuc 
et al. 2007). Most impressively, a series of studies conducted by John T. Jost 
and others have suggested that distinct sets of ideological belief systems can be 
empirically differentiated, that these belief systems are associated not only with 
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political orientation but also with lifestyle and personality differences (Jost, 
Nosek, and Gosling 2008), and, fi nally, that “people are motivated to engage in 
‘system justifi cation’—defi ned as the tendency to defend, bolster, and rationalize 
the societal status quo—even when social change would be preferable from the 
standpoint of self-interest” (Jost 2006, 651). 
 The last obstacle to the practical success of deliberative democracy that 
this article will discuss is that of the need for citizens to be informed about their 
world in order to make decisions about it. Because he is only concerned with 
establishing the basic principles of justice, in his classical formulation of the ideal 
deliberative space John Rawls (1999, 119) specifi es that all that is required for 
citizens to reason in public about the good is knowledge about the general features 
of the political world: that some people are rich and others are poor, some good 
and others bad, that some external goods are necessary for life and more goods 
make life better, and so on. However, when it comes to practical questions regard-
ing what to do about a contemporary social problem, good  deliberation seems 
to demand knowledge of the biological, psychological, social, economic, politi-
cal, and juridical relations relevant to the question at hand. As Robert B. Talisse 
summarizes this problem of public ignorance, “If [citizens] prove unable to 
 understand the basic political facts from which inferences are to be drawn, they 
are unfi t for deliberative democracy” (2005, 456). In this instance, “unfi t” does 
not necessarily mean that these citizens are unable to deliberate. Rather, because 
they cannot gain the relevant information to make a rational and informed decision 
or because they do not care enough to gain it (Posner 2003, 151; Somin 1998), 
such people are much more likely to arrive at conclusions that are motivated by 
appeal to emotions or that are due to suasion by elites or to merely fall back on 
ideological beliefs. 
 With all these obstacles to the practical implementation of deliberative 
democracy, the chance of its practical success would seem to be pretty bleak. 
However, along with noting the obstacles to deliberative democracy, many fea-
sibility theorists have also attempted to formulate a deliberative democracy that 
recognizes and deals with these impediments. At this point in the debate, plausible 
solutions have already been given to most of the hurdles just listed. Taking the 
problem of the necessity of a neutral space for discussion fi rst, John Dryzek’s 
argument that what is required for deliberation is not necessarily a neutral space 
but merely a pluralistic space that forbids coercive discourse and which permits 
and facilitates communication among a variety of discursive strategies while 
ceding discursive privilege to none seems about right. In the forums that he 
envisions, rational arguments would have to compete with many other forms of 
discourse. For instance, reasoned arguments would have to compete against or 
ally with those telling stories about their experience, with rhetorical pleas, and 
with those seeking solidarity through greeting and recognition (Dryzek 2000, 
68–80). By prohibiting any form of discourse from achieving hegemony and 
by establishing a space in which different modes of discourse compete on equal 
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terms to infl uence others’ preferences, the requirement of institutional neutrality 
for deliberation can be roughly met. 
 Dealing with the fact that manipulation of opinion has always already 
taken place prior to deliberation and that, to some extent, it will always be a 
factor during deliberations is, however, trickier than the problem of the  necessity 
of a neutral space. It is, however, mostly tractable. To second what Cheryl Misak 
(2000), James Bohman (1998a), and Robert B. Talisse (2004) have argued, 
the problem that the manipulation of opinion presents to democracy can be 
dealt with by reframing deliberation as a process of public inquiry. Instead of 
envisioning the deliberative process as one where subjects make use of their 
existing knowledge in order to convince others that their idea of the good is 
the one that should be adopted, deliberation conceived as a process of public 
inquiry views deliberation as a process by which a plurality of investigators, 
using a plurality of methods, inquires into many domains of human conduct 
(Bohman 1998b, 472). Rather than being the  substance of the deliberation, 
individual beliefs here become  subject to investigation. The effects of elite 
opinion, rhetoric, and media bias can thereby be mitigated. This is the case 
because, in the process of inquiry and in the discussion of its results, these 
beliefs can be challenged, confi rmed, disconfi rmed, and altered by the practical 
reasoning of others about the world. If they are discovered to be unfounded, 
too narrow, or uninformed, they can then be rejected or modifi ed. 
 These practical reasons and this practical reasoning may come not only 
from those that are affected directly by the problem at hand or by its solution (and 
thus have some relevant insight) but also by those who, in their capacity as social 
 scientists, have investigated social and economic phenomena relevant to under-
standing the problem and proposing possible solutions. 2 To give one example, if 
citizens of an economically depressed region believe that enticing large corpora-
tions to locate or remain in their area will create jobs, stability, and prosperity, 
then data from economists showing that, in general, such public subsidies have not 
brought about these results (Buss 1999) may encourage the public to reconsider its 
views. This is not to say that social scientists will have the last word. To continue 
with this example, it may be the case that citizens retain local knowledge that sug-
gests that a particular industry will have a better chance for success in this region 
than in others. In cases where local experience and knowledge confl ict with those 
of the expert, it is conceivable and desirable that, during the course of the public 
inquiry, this experience comes to inform and possibly correct the understanding 
of the expert (Bohman 2003, 103). At the end of this process, a collective and 
informed conclusion about what is to be done can be reached. 
 In this understanding of deliberation as collective inquiry, the conclusions 
that any deliberation reaches are understood to be hypothetical. If it is a good 
solution, then the political course of action decided upon will bring about the result 
that the deliberators identifi ed as desirable. If these means do not bring about the 
desired end, then the decision was not good and another inquiry is needed. Treating 
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deliberation as inquiry thereby solves not only the problem of manipulation but 
also the epistemological problem mentioned near the beginning of the essay that 
plagues purely procedural deliberative democracy. With the pragmatic criterion 
for verifi cation just outlined, there is now an independent standard by which to 
gauge whether or not reasons are good or bad, namely, whether they allow for the 
realization of the goal that a specifi c deliberation decided upon. 
 Another benefi t of deliberative democracy reconceived as a process of pub-
lic inquiry is that it deals with the problem of public ignorance. In every version 
of deliberation—including the purely procedural—deliberation is understood to 
be transformative inasmuch as it results in a “change of preferences on the bases 
of which people decide how to act” collectively (Przeworski 1998, 140). However, 
when it is conceived of as a process of collective inquiry, the effect of deliberation 
is understood to be transformative not only of preferences but also of beliefs about 
the world and about what the good is. In this process, ignorance is overcome as 
existing beliefs are submitted to the critical examination that comes about when 
these beliefs are challenged in a public forum by different beliefs and values and 
by empirical data. In short, the transformation that deliberation as public inquiry 
brings about is not only political but also educational. 
 Despite the promise that deliberation reconceived as pluralistic public 
inquiry holds to overcome the practical hurdles to successful and fair democratic 
deliberation, it is hard to see how this process can correct for and overcome those 
factors that compromise individual autonomy by virtue of their bypassing reason 
entirely. This is because ideology and emotional appeals are somewhat immune to 
the effects of corrective reason and contrary evidence. In cases like those where 
representations of terror or death directly affect the emotions and motivate specifi c 
types of reactions, perhaps the best that we can do is to adopt rules like those 
suggested above about coercion that require us to be suspicious of rhetoric that 
involves known or suspected triggers. 
 As for correcting for ideology, a similar proposal might be made. However, 
as ideology is constructive of basic beliefs and of reason and is more subtle in 
its effects than propaganda (which mainly appeals to the emotions), any rule or 
rules could only be proposed after extensive study of the ways in which specifi c 
ideologies function to make certain judgments about the world seem reasonable 
and others not. This accomplished, we might be able to establish rules that cor-
rect for, say, the tendency of a certain class to believe that inequality is natural. 
However, another diffi culty soon arises as it is impossible to prove that the 
diagnosis of an ideology (which then leads to the formulation of such a rule) is 
not itself the product of ideological thinking. This is because any diagnosis of a 
particular group’s ideology is always going to be made by a subject (or subjects) 
who is embedded in a particular ideology. As Cynthia Willett argues in her article 
in this volume, there is no extra-ideological or universal perspective from which 
to identify and correct procedurally for ideologies. For instance, in the example 
given above, only a subject whose perspective has been produced such that he or 
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she suspects that inequality is not natural would initiate a research project into 
why another group believes that it is so. 
 Even with the conclusion that there is a category of obstacles to successful 
deliberation that are somewhat or even totally ineliminable, there is little doubt 
that deliberative democracy reconceived as pluralistic public inquiry presents 
a practicable mode of political association that is superior to our existing elec-
tive democracy in terms of procedural fairness, epistemological results, and the 
formation of a general political will. Though it may never produce outcomes as 
fair as those hypothesized in theories of pure procedural deliberative democracy, 
it does present itself as capable of producing better outcomes than our current 
system. Specifi cally, it is better in the sense that what results from public inquiry 
is not merely a decision upon which everyone can agree but also the generation 
of a “community” in the sense John Dewey uses the word in  The Public and Its 
Problems (1927, 208): that is, a body politic who communicates suffi ciently about 
the relations that constitute it such that it is able to realize the goods it identifi es 
as desirable. 
 This is all good news, of course, but what do we do with that obstacle to 
deliberative democracy, ideology, that seems so hard to compensate for or elimi-
nate? One of the fi rst things that we might do with ideology is to engage in critique, 
not of existing ideologies but of the concept of ideology itself.  Understood as 
false consciousness that hides real social and economic relations, ideology obvi-
ously compromises any deliberative effort in that the political ends that present 
themselves to a citizen as public goods may, in fact, only be good for a certain 
group of people.
However, and as the point made above about the diffi culty of fi nding an 
extra-ideological position suggests, the defi nition of ideology as false has proven 
to be highly problematic. 3 If we abandon the idea of ideology as false conscious-
ness, though, and instead understand ideology as a “lived and believed reality” 
(Rehman 2007, 224), which constitutes subjects as subjects and whose effect is the 
reproduction of defi nite socioeconomic relations between particular groups, then 
ideology might not be the obstacle to effective deliberation that it at fi rst appears. 
Under this revised defi nition, ideology always exists and cannot be overcome. 
However, it exists only in the specifi c beliefs held by individuals, beliefs produced 
through each person’s interactions with the world (Althusser 1971, 159). 
 Even though these beliefs make themselves known only through the actions 
of individuals, they are for the most part not singular but particular. This is because 
most human activities are associative or are structured by our associations. Our 
shared interactions, institutions, and practices tend to produce groups that conceive 
of the world in similar ways (hence the particularity). These conceptions are all 
evaluative, and each valuation has its effect on a specifi c group’s practices. Thus 
parts of the world are seen as important, valued, useful, or reasonable to a certain 
group while other parts are left out, devalued, or seen as useless and unreason-
able. Often one group’s conceptions of the world (and the practices derivative 
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of those beliefs) are opposed by other groups who have had different associative 
 experiences and therefore conceive of and work in the world differently. 
 If we accept this understanding of ideology as those necessary sets of 
beliefs held by groups of individuals whose effect is to guarantee the reproduc-
tion of certain socioeconomic relations, then we might perhaps be moved to see 
ideology not as an obstacle to deliberative democratic practice but as its neces-
sary precondition. As was noted above, deliberative democracy conceived as 
public inquiry depends on a plurality of subjects or groups, each with a different 
perspective on the way in which the world works and about how to realize the 
good. It needs these perspectives if it is to subject these ideas to scrutiny and to 
critique in order to arrive at a better understanding of what the real public good 
is and how to realize it. To give two examples, that certain participants in delib-
eration about economic policy refl exively balk when they are told that tax cuts 
for the wealthiest 5 percent of Americans will eventually benefi t the quality of 
life for all Americans is a good thing for effective deliberation. It is also a good 
thing that another group claims that less regulation for medical device makers 
and pharmaceutical companies will lead to better public health. As both claims 
are liable to be contested by groups with opposing ideologies, each provides a 
point at which collective inquiry can begin. Confl icting ideologies can thus be 
understood as a prerequisite for deliberation. 
 That ideology is a prerequisite for deliberative democracy may also be 
true in another sense. Surveying the literature of deliberative democracy, it is 
obvious that this project is—even in its most abstract and speculative form—a 
radically egalitarian one. At base, deliberative democracy is always presented as 
a more legitimate form of democracy because it corrects for the distortions that 
structural inequalities, uneven education advantages, entrenched bureaucracy, 
representative democracy, economic and media interests, and a public distracted 
from or disinterested in politics introduce into the expression of the democratic 
will. Those that benefi t from these distortions are wont not to notice them or 
not to believe that they present a problem for democracy. This not noticing the 
contradiction between their democratic ideal and actual democratic practice is 
ideology at work. However, there is also another group of people who recognize 
these failings as pernicious and desire to ameliorate them. This latter ideology is 
expressed at the practical level by those who attempt to make political institutions 
fairer and more responsive to the demos and who also try to make the demos more 
active in political institutions. It is expressed at the theoretical level by those who 
attempt to convince others that deliberation is desirable, feasible, and necessary, 
something that has hopefully been accomplished with this article. 
 Notes 
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  1. In a Quinnipiac University Poll from May 8–12, 2008, that asked the question “Do you think 
going to war with Iraq was the right thing for the United States to do or the wrong thing?” 62 percent 
of respondents said that they now think the action was “wrong” (www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm, 
accessed June 19, 2008). 
  2. The introduction of social scientifi c research into this discussion of the obstacles to deliberative 
democracy is also an example of this use of expert opinion. 
  3. So much so that, since Gramsci, most serious Marxian thinkers on the subject have abandoned 
this conception of ideology. See Rehman 2007, 219–25, as well as Rosen 1996. 
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